Recent works have independently suggested that Quantum Mechanics might permit for procedures that transcend the power of Turing Machines as well as of 'standard' Quantum Computers. These approaches rely on and indicate that Quantum Mechanics seems to support some infinite variant of classical parallel computing.
Having thus indicated the fundamental power of this machine, Turing then proceeded to exhibit its limitation by formally proving that the Halting Problem H -the question whether a given TM M eventually halts or rather continues executing indefinitely -cannot be decided by any TMM 0 . Notice that, according to Definition 1.1, this hypothetical M 0 is required to always give the correct answer and to terminate. More precisely, the difficulty inherent to the Halting Problem consists in telling within finite time whether M does not halt; for, simply simulating M step by step, M 0 can easily identify the case when M does terminate.
Turing's result initiated the flourishing field of Computability or Recursion Theory [28] . Its goal is to distinguish computable from uncomputable problems and to classify the latter according to their degree of uncomputability [31] . For example, the following celebrated result of Matiyasevich has settled Hilbert's Tenth Problem to the negative by proving it equivalent to H:
Theorem 1.2 ([26]) On the one hand, a given description of a Diophantine Equation E (like
Fermat's famous "a n + b n = c n " for a, b, c, n ∈ N) can computably be transformed into a TM M such that it holds: M terminates iff E admits an integral solution.
On the other hand, a given TM M can computably be converted into the description of a Diophantine Equation E in such a way that, again, M halts iff E admits an integral solution. In particular since, according to [32] , the first cannot be decided algorithmically, neither can the latter.
Apart from the TM, many further sensible notions of computability have been proposed: e.g., µ-Recursion (which gave the field its name), Herbrand-Gödel-Computability (which led to the programming language Prolog), or λ-Calculus (which stipulated Lisp). But they were all shown equivalent to the TM by Church, Kleene, Post, Turing and others; cf. e.g. [28, Chapter I] or [2, Section 26.3+4]. The popular language Java for example is equivalent, too: internet provides many applets for simulating a TM; and conversely devising a Java interpreter on a TM. is merely tedious but not difficult. Even a Pentium r processor is basically just a TM-although a very fast one; recall that we are dealing with problems which cannot be solved computationally at all, neither quickly nor slowly. For the very same reason, (at least 'standard') Quantum Computers are still no more powerful than an ordinary TM [20, p.3 footnote 1].
Church-Turing Hypothesis
It should be emphasized that both Halting and Hilbert's Tenth Problem are desirable to be solved for very practical reasons. The first for instance arises in automatized software verification; indeed, correctness of some Java source code includes its termination which, by the above considerations, cannot be checked algorithmically. Similarly, a hypothetical algorithm for deciding feasibility of Diophantine Equations could be applied to computer-proving not only Fermat's Last Theorem but also to settle many other still open questions for example in number theory.
Observing that [32, 26] ruled out the possibility of a Turing Machine to decide either of these problems, people have since long tried to devise other computing devices exceeding its principal power. However the perpetual failure to do so plus the aforementioned results of a TM being able to simulate many other notions of computability have eventually led to what has become known as the Church-Turing Hypothesis:
Anything that can be computed in practice, is also computable by a TM.
We emphasize that, due to its informal nature, this hypothesis cannot be proven formally. Informal arguments in its favor usually point out that computation is a physical process which, by mathematically describing the physical laws it is governed by, can be simulated by a TM up to arbitrary finite numerical precision; and infinite accuracy were required only for 'chaotic' processes which are too sensitive to perturbations than being harnessable for practical computation anyway.
However it has later been pointed out that certain theories of quantum gravitation might actually not admit a simulation by a TM [18, p.546]; furthermore even Classical Mechanics seems to conceivably provide for processes whose simulation requires infinite precision during intermediate times only, whereas the resulting behavior is asymptotically stable and thus suited well to realize a non-Turing form of physical computation [34] . Moreover the laws of nature we know so far cannot be deduced to fundamentally restrict computation [5] .
In fact neither Church nor Turing themselves have put forward a claim as universal as the way 'their' hypothesis is often (mis-)interpreted [12] . Instead, literature contains and discusses a rich variety of related hypotheses [27, Section 2.2].
Hypercomputation
Anyway, the question remains open whether there might exist a computing device more powerful than the TM or not. To get an idea towards how a Hyper computer might look like, Theoreticians have started considering super-TMs and their respective fundamental computing capabilities. This established the flourishing field of research called 'Hypercomputation' [14] which entire volumes of significant journals have become dedicated to [10, 8] . Devising such a formal model (i.e., an idealized abstraction) of a Hypercomputer proceeds in many cases less by adding extensions to but rather by removing restrictions from a TM. Conditions a)-e) underlie the mourned limitations of the classical TM, and dropping one or more of them leads to several well-known models of hypercomputation; see, e.g. [27, Section 3] or [13, Section 2]. Oracle Machines for instance, subject of Turing's Dissertation in Princeton [33] and now core of Recursion Theory [31, 28] , correspond to TMs with initial memory inscription, that is, they remove Condition b); Blum, Shub, and Smale's R-Machine [7] abolishes Condition c) by allowing each cell to store a real number; while Infinite Time Machines due to [21] lift Condition d).
The proposal, consideration, and investigation of such enhanced abstract models of computation and their respective computational powers by Logicians and Theoretical Computer Scientists has proven particular seminal regarding related contributions from Theoretical Physics on their realizability. For example, [4] has indicated that a physical system breaking Condition a) might actually exist 1 ; while [22, 30] pointed out that in General Relativity there might exist 1 space-time geometries allowing to watch within finite time a computer execute an infinite number of steps and thus to lift Condition d).
Quantum Mechanical Hypercomputation
Recently, several new approaches have been suggested for solving either the Halting Problem [9, 11, 1] or Hilbert's Tenth Problem [24, 25] . They exploit Quantum Mechanics and thus form a nice counterpart to previous approaches based on General Relativity [22, 30] as the other pillar of non-classical physics. Recalling that 'standard' Quantum Computing does not exceed Turing's Barrier, these approaches must be non-standard in some sense which closer inspection reveals to be infinite parallelism:
• [27, Section 3] . The present work describes in Section 2 the theoretical consequences from lifting Condition e), that is the principal computing power of infinite parallelism.
We conclude this section with an already announced remark on the notion of existence. 
Infinite Parallel Computing
The prospering field of Parallel Computing knows and has agreed upon a small collection of models as theoretical abstractions for devising and analyzing new algorithms for various actual parallel machines [2, Sections 45.2 and 47.2]. Of course with respect to their principal power, that is computability rather than complexity, they are all equivalent to the TM.
However when talking about infinite parallelism, seemingly no such agreement has been established, cf. e.g. [15, p.284] ; and in fact no equivalence, either, as will turn out. For instance, of what kind are the countably infinitely many individual computers that are to operate concurrently -TMs or finite automata? In the first case, do they all execute the same program? When is the result to be read off? The answers to these questions fundamentally affect the capabilities of the resulting system.
Infinite Cellular Automata
Consider parallelism in an infinite cellular automaton in the plane. More specifically, we refer to Conway's famous Game of Life [3, Ch. 25] where in each step, any cell's successor state concurrently is determined by its present state as well as those of its eight adjacent ones' as follows (cf. Figure 1) :
• A dead cell with exactly three neighbors alive becomes alive, too; otherwise it remains dead.
• A living cell with two or three neighbors alive stays alive; otherwise (0,1,4. . . 8 living neighbors, that is) it dies. Here, finiteness of the initial configuration enters crucially of course. One can indeed show that infinite initial configurations in ii) correspond to non-blank memory contents and thus to dropping in Observation 1.4 both Conditions e) and b).
Infinite Turing Concurrency
In order to focus on the power obtained from infinite parallelism only (that is, by removing just Condition e), now consider the finite automata replaced by TMs. Indeed the three citations in Section 1.3 indicate that, whereas Quantum Computing -and in particular simulating a single classical TM -requires only a finite (or at most countably infinite) number of dimensions from quantum mechanical Hilbert Space, its infinitely many dimensions provide room for an infinite number of TMs: cf. Hilbert's Hotel.
Strictness of Chomsky's Hierarchy implies that a single TM is provably more powerful than a single automaton [2, Section 25.3] . One may therefore expect that the capabilities of an infinite number of TMs exceed those of an infinite number of automata (and thus actually lead to hypercomputation); by how much, however, turns out to depend.
In analogy to Definition 1.1, consider first the following notion of solving a problem by means of infinite parallelism.
Definition 2.3 Fix a problem L ⊆ N and a countably infinite family
and
However observe that, whereas each individual M k halts, the time required to do so may depend on k so that it takes infinitely long for the entire family (M k ) k to terminate. (We point out that this behavior resembles the fair infinite nondeterminism of [16] .) In order to know the result within finite time, the following additional requirement is therefore important:
iii) if upon input of any x ∈ N, all M k terminate within finite time bounded independently of k.
While seeming sensible at first glance, a second thought reveals that, even with this restriction, the resulting notion of 'infinitely parallel computability' is still unreasonable: simply because any problem L ⊆ N becomes trivially solvable by an appropriate family (M k ) k . To this end let the program executed by M k store the constant "1" if k ∈ L and the constant "0" otherwise. Let its main part then operate as follows: Upon input of x ∈ N test whether x = k; if so, output the stored constant, otherwise output "0"; then terminate.
The point is of course that the according family (M k ) k solving L is only shown to exist. More precisely there is in general no means of computing, given k ∈ N, a description of M k and its constants. This insight suggests to finally add the following further requirement, in Theoretical Computer Science known as a uniformity condition. Here, encoding refers to a sort of 'blueprint' of M k or, more formally, its Gödel Number [23, Section 9.1.2].
Computational Power of Infinite Turing Concurrency
This section reveals that the Definition 2.3(i-iv) indeed yields an interesting non-trivial way of hypercomputation. More precisely we show that, in this sense, infinite Turing-Parallelism can • solve the Halting Problem H
• as well as Hilbert's Tenth Problem
• but not Totality.
While H refers to the question whether given TM M , started on a single given input x, eventually terminates, Totality asks whether M halts on all possible inputs. So in contrast to the first, this even more important property of correct software still remains intractable to automated checking even on this kind of hypercomputer.
Theorem 2.4 The Halting Problem is solvable by an infinity of TMs working in parallel in the sense of Definition 2.3(i-iv).
Proof: For each k ∈ N, let M ′ k proceed as follows: Given M and x, simulate the first k steps of M operating on x; if M halts within these steps, then output "1" and terminate; otherwise output "0" and terminate. Observe that the family (M In order to achieve Property iii) in the above proof, the crucial ingredient is the below classical construction. It basically says that any TM can be speed up by a constant factor. Recall that 'semi-decidability' (also called recursive enumerability) weakens 'decidability' from Definition 1.1 in that, here, the TM is allowed in case x ∈ L to not halt but to loop endlessly [23, Section 825].
Proof: By the above remark, it remains to consider the case that L is solvable by some parallel family (M k ) k according to Definition 2.3. Upon input of x ∈ N, sequentially simulate the (M k ) k as follows: For each k ∈ N,
• obtain from M 0 a description of M k by virtue of iv)
• and simulate M k on input x. (Observe its termination according to Property i)
• If output is "1", halt; otherwise proceed with next k. 
This algorithm indeed terminates iff at least one
M k outputs "1", that is (ii), iff x ∈ L.
Conclusion
Section 1 has pointed out that recent and independent approaches due to Kieu, Calude, and Pavlov to hypercomputation via quantum mechanics rely on some sort of infinite parallelism. Regarding the respective complicated intertwined quantum mechanical constructions, procedures, and analyses, we suggest to bring more clarity into this subject by considering algorithmic/ computational issues separately from physical ones. This leads to the following two questions to be treated individually: 1) Does Quantum Mechanics allow for infinite parallelism; and, if so, of what kind?
2) What kinds of idealized infinite parallelism yield which principal computational power; that is, does it and by how far exceed the fundamental capabilities of a TM?
Section 2 contains answers to the second question. It reveals that in fact infinite classical (i.e., Turing-) parallelism is sufficient for solving both the Halting Problem as well as Hilbert's Tenth Problem. This leaves open whether the infinite dimensions of quantum mechanical Hilbert Space do indeed allow for this kind of infinite classical parallelism. Specifically, -preparation of a certain initial state, -its maintenance (in particular coherence) through-out the computational evolution, and -read-out of the final result are likely to raise here even more difficulties than already in the finite-dimensional case of 'standard' Quantum Computing [20, Section 7.2] . For example only recently has it become possible to read out a single spin [29] . However (im-)practicality of hypercomputation should not be confused with (un-)existence, particularly in the light of Remark 1.5.
